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The "Gag Rule" Revisited:
Physicians as Abortion Gatekeepers
M. Gregg Bloche
To the surprise of many and the dismay of some, the U.S.
Supreme Court took it upon itself last term to proclaim a
national compromise on the question of abortion.' The
Court's announced truce, an elaboration on Justice
O'Connor's "undue burden" idea, is pragmatic in design
but unlikely to prove stable in practice. The three justices
who spoke for the Court disparaged Roe with reluctant
praise, then upheld its outer shell on the ground that social
expectations and the need to sustain the appearance of the
rule of law made it impolitic to do otherwise. This awk-
ward doctrinal invention seems unlikely to yield a lasting
peace. However artful as political brokerage, it is
unpersuasive as principled jurisprudence. Its explicitly po-
litical calculus invites skepticism about its authors' com-
mitment to principled method even as it purports to
preserve public regard for judicial legitimacy. Moreover,
there is an unexplained "disconnect" between the opinion's
avowed preservation of Roe's "essential holding" and its
abandonment of Roe's commitment to reproductive free-
dom as a compelling interest.
Should the "undue burden" approach nevertheless
survive for a time, its "standardless"' character will en-
courage continuing cease-fire violations as abortion oppo-
nents probe its ill-marked limits. Its survival, though, is as
uncertain as its substantive content. Not only were its three
proponents unable to win over a majority; four justices
proclaimed their commitment to frankly overruling Roe.
The election of Bill Clinton is no guarantee that a fifth vote
will not emerge in the future.3
Whatever the "undue burden" test's prospects for
survival, its ascension to the status of governing law has
focused attention on the possibility of an American abor-
tion compromise. The moment is thus opportune for a
fresh look at another recent attempt at compromise-one
pursued in a narrower legal context, without success so
far. The context--discussion of abortion with patients at
federally-funded family planning clinics-became widely
familiar to Americans a year ago, after the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Rust v. Sullivan.
4
Rust upheld federal regulations directing such clinics
not to counsel or refer patients for abortion "as a method
of family planning."5 The regulations made compliance a
prerequisite for federal funding under Title X of the Public
Health Service Act. These bitterly controversial rules were
presumed by activists on both sides of the abortion divide
to impose a near-absolute ban on the discussion of abor-
tion with clinic patients. This presumption quickly hard-
ened into conventional wisdom as a broad coalition of
medical and family planning organizations 6 mobilized to
persuade Congress to kill the regulations.7 Opponents of
the rules characterized them as a flat ban on abortion
counseling and referrals except in medical circumstances
posing an immediate threat to a pregnant woman's life.
News reports presumed the validity of this interpretation,
dubbing the regulations a "gag rule." The American
Medical Association,8 the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists,9 and other professional groups
insisted that the regulations would force physicians
to commit malpractice by withholding medically neces-
sary information. Family planning leaders warned that
unless Congress stopped the new rules from taking effect,
their programs would be forced to make agonizing
choices between refusing to discuss abortion and forgoing
federal dollars.-°
As I will explain below, this conventional wisdom
was dictated neither by the "gag rule" itself nor the Rust
opinion. On the contrary, the "gag rule" was artfully-
some might say disingenuously--crafted to incorporate a
potentially broad therapeutic exception, unrestricted by
any regulatory definition of medical need. Partisans to the
abortion controversy ignored this exception, thereby frus-
trating the Bush administration's effort to exploit it to
soften opposition to the "gag rule." Instead, pro-choice
and pro-life" activists framed the public debate over abor-
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tion counseling in absolutist terms. Even medical and
family planning leaders persisted in portraying the "gag"
as fitting tightly, despite the therapeutic exception's po-
tential as an escape from the requirement that abortion
information be withheld. The therapeutic exception thus
failed politically as a compromise device in the abortion
counseling context.
In this article, I explore this failure, with an eye toward
its broader lessons about the social uses of medical discre-
tion and the difficulty of achieving an abortion compromise
in America. I begin by examining the legal underpinning
beneath the widespread belief that the "gag rule" imposed
a near-absolute ban on discussion of the abortion option.
This conventional wisdom, I conclude, collapses on careful
inspection. It fails utterly to account for the strong support
to be found in the Title X regulations and their larger legal
context for a therapeutic exception unconstrained by ad-
ministrative or judicial definition.- Next, I observe that this
legal unboundedness would have empowered Title X clinic
physicians (and perhaps others who do counseling) to
exercise broad discretion over abortion access, under the
rubric of medical indication. The limits of this clinical
discretion would have been self-imposed, explicitly or oth-
erwise, by clinic administrators, professionally-accepted
practice norms, and personal conscience.
By aggressively employing this therapeutic exception,
family planning clinicians could have spoken freely about
abortion, shielded by the law's deference to medical au-
thority. The legal contours of the exception allowed phy-
sicians (and perhaps others) to explore pregnancy
termination with their patients and to refer them for care
that could include abortion. By so doing, however, physi-
cians would have become abortion gatekeepers. This
would have raised difficult ethical and clinical questions
about the extent to which medical judgment should be
allowed to incorporate (and shield) socially-disputed
moral choices. I briefly consider some of these questions,
along with the countervailing appeal of preserving a mea-
sure of intimate freedom under medical cover.
I then conclude by positing some connections
between the moral infirmities of medical gatekeeping
and the political failure of the therapeutic exception. I
suggest, in essence, that this failure was ensured by a
strong resonance between the exception's moral infirmi-
ties and the fears of the medical leaders, pro-choice ac-
tivists, and abortion opponents who framed the public
debate over the "gag rule." The potential breadth of the
therapeutic exception went unrecognized and unex-
plored because professional and popular understanding
of the abortion counseling regulations was molded by
the activists who framed the debate. Their most passion-
ately felt fears and aspirations are sure to complicate the
continuing search for a workable American compromise
on abortion.
The "gag rule's" therapeutic exception
In challenging the "gag rule's" constitutionality, the plain-
tiffs in Rust asserted that the rule would bar abortion
counseling and referral under all "medical circum-
stances",13 including danger to a pregnant woman's life.
Popular accounts of the Rust decision announced this dire
implication." But this consequence was hardly clear from
the language of the regulation at issue. The regulation, part
of a package of revisions to the Title X program promul-
gated by the Reagan administration in 1988, instructed
clinics not to provide "counseling concerning" or "referral
for" abortion "as a method of family planning.""s The
reference to "family planning" was drawn from a 1970
statute that the regulation purports to apply. This statute
proscribes the use of federal funds "in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning.'
' 6
Were the qualifying phrase, "as a method of family
planning," to be read in accordance with health profes-
sionals' understanding of "family planning," the regula-
tion would have little clinical significance. Family planning
professionals advise contraception, not abortion, for the
prevention of unwanted births. 7 In family planning prac-
tice, abortion is at best a back-up measure, to be consid-
ered if contraception fails or is not used. From this clinical
perspective, abortion in the event of inadequate contracep-
tion is not a method of family planning; it is a last resort
when family planning fails.
Only if "abortion as a method of family planning" is
understood more broadly, as encompassing abortion in
the event that contraception fails or is not used, can the
regulation be read to forbid a professionally-accepted prac-
tice. Abortion opponents generally advocate this broader
interpretation; for most, abortion as a response to contra-
ceptive failure is no more acceptable than abortion as a
primary means of birth control. From this perspective
(shared by the Bush administration and probably by sym-
pathetic federal judges), abortion in either circumstance is
"a method of family planning."
Understood in this way, the regulation at issue
restricts clinical speech and discretion to a greater degree
than do current professional standards. Yet the qualifying
phrase "method of family planning" still leaves room for
exceptions to the regulation's ban on abortion counseling
and referral. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much
in Rust, in a paragraph that received little notice. In
dismissing First Amendment-related concerns, the Court
said that it did not "read the regulations to bar abortion
referral or counseling "when a woman's pregnancy
"places her life in imminent peril."' 8 Writing for the ma-
jority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained: "It does not
seem that a medically necessitated abortion in such cir-
cumstances would be the equivalent of its use as a
"method of family planning."' r9
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The Court thus drew a distinction between abortion
as a means of family planning and abortion as a medical
necessity. In so doing, the Court characterized another
provision in the Rust regulations-one requiring clinics to
refer patients for needed emergency care°--as a "specific
exemption" from the ban on abortion counseling and
referral.- The regulations, the Court said, "contemplate
that a [family planning] project would be permitted to
engage in otherwise prohibited abortion-related activity in
such circumstances. -z The Court thus read the regulations
to allow abortion counseling and referral on medical ne-
cessity grounds, at least in circumstances of emergency
involving danger to a pregnant woman's life
Moreover, the justices intimated that this medical
necessity "exemption" might extend beyond medical emer-
gency or danger to life. The Court noted that a pre-
existing regulation, untouched by the 1988 revisions,
requires family planning clinics to provide for "necessary
referral to other medical facilities when medically indi-
cated."23 The Court cited this provision as additional sup-
port for its conclusion that the regulations allowed
"otherwise prohibited abortion-related activity" under
some circumstances. The justices stopped short of explicit
confirmation that this pre-existing requirement extends to
medical indications other than life-threatening emergency.
But judicial precedent, the history of the 1988 revisions,
and Bush administration statements about the application
of the 1988 regulations support a less circumscribed
approach to medical indication.
In 1981, in Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota,
a lower court held that the older provision requires family
planning programs to refer pregnant women for "medi-
cally indicated" abortions.4 Such referrals, the court said,
are consistent with the 1970 statutory proscription against
abortion as a "method of family planning." Employing
language similar to Chief Justice Rehnquist's in Rust, the
court explained: "where such a referral is necessary be-
cause of medical indications, abortion is not being consid-
ered as a method of family planning at all, but rather as a
medical treatment possibility."5 Quoting a 1979 Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) interpretive
opinion, the court added that abortion referral could be
"medically indicated" based on either "the patient's medi-
cal condition" or "the condition of the fetus."6
In 1987, HHS proposed the new restrictions at issue in
RustY1 The HHS proposal made no change in the "medi-
cally indicated" referral requirement. During the comment
period that preceded the Department's promulgation of its
final rules, antiabortion activists objected vehemently.
Some insisted that the term "medically indicated" be ex-
plicitly limited to situations of imminent danger to a preg-
nant woman's life. Others urged that the term be defined
so as to bar abortion referrals under all circumstances. 8
But HHS refused to revise the rules to limit the scope of
permissible medical indications. In comments released with
the final rules, HHS argued that to do so was "infeasible"
since the term "refers to an infinite variety of physical
conditions. "19 Nor did the Department disavow the open-
ended view of medical indication espoused in its 1979
interpretive opinion.
Moreover, HHS did not take the position, advocated
by antiabortion forces,3 ° that its new rules made Valley
Family Planning irrelevant to the current meaning of
"medically indicated" because Valley relied upon an HHS
interpretation issued prior to the new rules. Abortion op-
ponents asserted that the new regulations changed the
meaning of "medically indicated" in the pre-existing refer-
ral rule, rendering the 1979 HHS opinion obsolete. The
Department, however, adopted the position that the mean-
ing of "medically indicated" was "unaffected" by the new
rules.3' HHS noted that Valley did not limit the
Department's authority to issue new regulations. But HHS
professed fealty to Valley's construction of the older rule
requiring "medically indicated" referrals.3-
On the other hand, in comments released with its
final rules, HHS encouraged readers to do what it had
refused to do in the regulations themselves--equate medi-
cal indication with danger to a pregnant woman's life. For
example, in purporting to square the 1988 regulations
with Valley, the Department said that referral for possible
abortion "was required under [Valley] when medically
necessary, such as when the life of the mother is endan-
gered"3 (emphasis added). Some have read such com-
ments to establish that danger to a woman's life is the
only allowable medical indication. But this is belied by
HHS's explicit refusal to write such a limit on the mean-
ing of "medically indicated" into the regulations them-
selves. When federal regulations are plainly inconsistent
with their accompanying administrative comments, the
regulations are superior in legal authority. A policy plainly
rejected when the regulations were written cannot be
imported into the law through the back door, via accom-
panying comments.
Whatever the significance of the HHS comments at the
time they were issued, subsequent directives from the White
House and HHS suggested a less constrained view of
medical indication. In a Nov. 5, 1991 memorandum, Presi-
dent Bush issued the following instruction to HHS Secre-
tary Louis Sullivan regarding implementation of the
abortion counseling regulations:
If a woman is found to be pregnant and to have a
medical problem, she should be referred for complete
medical care, even if the ultimate result may be the
termination of her pregnancy.
An HHS directive sent to regional offices on March zo,
1992 repeated this instruction, citing the above-discussed
"medically indicated" referral rule as its basis. This rule,
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IHS said, "requires a physician to refer a pregnant woman
with a health problem to medical care appropriate to her
particular health problem, even if that referral ultimately
results in an abortion."
Nowhere in the President's memorandum or the HHS
directive were the open-ended terms "medical problem" or
"health problem" equated with life-threatening emergency.
Nor did these documents bar physicians from advising
pregnant patients about the abortion option, so long as
such advice could be characterized as "medical informa-
tion" about a "health" problem. Both the President's
memorandum and the HHS directive called for the regula-
tions to be applied so as not to "prevent a woman from
receiving complete medical information about her condi-
tion from a physician." Neither document imposed limits
on the range of "health" or "medical" problems that
might merit discussion of the abortion option.
The Bush administration thereby set the stage for
medicalization of family planning patients' access to abor-
tion. The White House and HHS directives conditioned
referral for possible abortion on a physician's diagnosis of
a "health problem." Moreover, they required that such
referrals be made to "full-service health care providers that
perform abortions, but not to providers whose principal
activity is providing abortion services." Finally, physicians
were the only health professionals explicitly allowed by the
directives to discuss abortion with patients (although nei-
ther directive explicitly barred non-physician staff, e.g.
nurses or social workers, from doing so).
These limitations posed substantial barriers to abor-
tion access. Because family planning clinics rely heavily on
non-physician counselors, failure to allow non-physicians
to discuss abortion would hinder clinic patients' access to
-medically indicated" abortion. The requirement that re-
ferrals be made only to "full-service" providers repre-
sented a more certain impediment to abortion access.
Relatively few "full service" providers perform abortions
nowadays. Political pressures and financial disincentives
have marginalized abortion practice to the specialty clin-
ics that the Bush administration has put off-limits. 34 On
the other hand, as I explain below, the Bush admin-
istration's open-ended approach to medical indication al-
lowed family planning physicians considerable latitude to
advise their patients about the abortion option. That fam-
ily planning clinics and the medical profession did not
seize upon the therapeutic exception as a way to soften
the "gag rule's" impact cannot be explained as the prod-
uct of regulatory constraint.
Physicians as abortion gatekeepers: the fluidity
of the therapeutic exception
In empowering clinic physicians to make exceptions to the
"gag rule" for health reasons, the Bush administration
invited the medical profession back into the business of
abortion gatekeeping. Not since 1973, when Roe v. Wade 5
constitutionalized a woman's right to an abortion, had
American physicians been expected to perform this prob-
lematic function, except in the case of third trimester
abortions.36 (Under Roe, states may proscribe these except
when "necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother."37) During the years preceding Roe, state legisla-
tures and courts mediated the conflict between old laws
that criminalized abortion and new demands for abortion
access by liberalizing provisions that permitted abortion
on therapeutic grounds. Provisions that allowed abortion
to save a pregnant woman's life were broadened in many
states to incorporate maternal health and fetal defect.38 An
influential model statute proposed by the American Law
Institute explicitly included the mother's mental health39
The practical effect of such provisions was to put the issue
of abortion access into the hands of physicians.
Roe transformed these provisions into historical curi-
osities. But the pre-Roe jurisprudence of medically indi-
cated abortion offers some guidance as to the potential
scope of the therapeutic exception to the Title X abortion
counseling restrictions. The leading judicial construction
of the pre-Roe therapeutic exception embraced an almost
unbounded view of both "health" and physician discre-
tion. In United States v. Vuitch,40 the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the contention that a statute criminalizing abor-
tion except in cases of danger to a woman's "life or health"
was unconstitutionally vague because the word "health" is
ambiguous. Insisting that the term "health" "presents no
problem of vagueness," the Court characterized "the gen-
eral usage and modern understanding of the word 'health"'
as "the '[sitate of being ... sound in body [or] mind"'4'
(quoting Webster's Dictionary). The Court added:
"whether a particular operation is necessary for a patient's
physical or mental health is a judgment that physicians are
obviously called upon to make routinely whenever surgery
is considered."4 The Court thus (i) equated health with
global personal well-being43 and (z) endorsed physician
judgment as the law's metric of medical need.
So interpreted, statutes legalizing abortions done to
preserve women's "health" encouraged sympathetic physi-
cians to be liberal in granting medical dispensation. Some
psychiatrists contended that unwanted pregnancy per se
was detrimental to a woman's mental health, justifying
therapeutic abortion.44 Others argued that the socioeco-
nomic stress of unwanted childbirth was critically impor-
tant in clinical assessment of a pregnancy's effect upon a
woman's mental health45-Criminal prosecution of physi-
cians who performed abortions on medical grounds was
rare. Although the boundary between a woman's health and
her personal wants remained a matter of dispute,46 physi-
cians committed to expanding abortion access made grow-
ing use of the therapeutic exception through the early 19 70s.
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Roe relieved the pressure on American physicians to
broaden abortion's therapeutic indications. Post-Roe medi-
cal thinking about abortion as therapy was influenced by
women's access to abortion on request. Medical indication
no longer served as a route of escape from the criminal
abortion laws. It was relevant only to clinical complica-
tions that threatened women who wanted to bear children.
Not surprisingly, abortions reported as having been per-
formed for "therapeutic" reasons now comprise a small
proportion of all American abortions.47
In view of the low reported incidence of therapeutic
abortion, the medical necessity exception to the family
planning "gag rule" might at first seem impossible to apply
in good faith to more than a small portion of pregnant
clients. Were medical necessity a fixed notion, unrespon-
sive to changes in the social context of clinical work, such
might be the case. But medical need is a fluid concept. Like
other socially recognized needs, it is reconceived as com-
munity and culture evolve. 48 Rising barriers to abortion
access, engendered by the anti-abortion politics that gave
rise to the "gag rule," could invite such a reconception
with respect to abortion.
Experience abroad confirms the potential flexibility of
the therapeutic exception. In many other countries, medi-
cal justification is necessary (absent rape or incest) to
obtain an abortion. This requirement tends to be inter-
preted broadly. Japanese law, which permits abortion "to
protect the life and health of the mother," includes eco-
nomic hardship as an abortion-justifying health consider-
ation.49 An Indian statute allows abortion when fetal
abnormality is expected or pregnancy threatens a woman's
physical or mental health. Liberal interpretation of the
maternal health provision ensures easy access to abortion.
Several European nations, including Spain, Portugal, and
Switzerland, have enacted similar requirements; these have
been applied with varying restrictiveness. In the United
Kingdom, an Act of Parliament permits abortion when
two physicians certify that continued pregnancy poses a
greater risk to a woman's life or physical or mental health
than does abortion. As applied, this statute has made
abortion available upon request.50
As I argue below, much of American abortion prac-
tice can potentially be redescribed in the language of medi-
cal indication. By engaging in such redescription,
physicians could have broadly applied the "'gag rule's"
therapeutic exception,5' as some did in the face of crimi-
nal abortion laws a generation ago. Neither the Title X
regulations nor judicial pronouncements on the permis-
sible scope of medical need as a justification for abortion
stood in the way. Indeed, Vuitch suggests a judicial incli-
nation to defer to physician judgment as the measure of
medical need.
To rein in physician judgment in the Title X abortion
counseling context, HHS would have needed to limit the
allowed medical indications for discussion of abortion.
As I noted above, HHS explicitly declined to do this.
Moreover, the constitutionality of such limits would have
been uncertain. The Rust majority suggested that medical
judgment may "enjoy protection under the First Amend-
ment from government regulation, even when subsidized
by the Government." 5
The legal unboundedness of the therapeutic exception
to the "gag rule" accorded considerable abortion gate-
keeping authority to Title X clinic physicians, whether or
not medical and family planning leaders acknowledge it.
Critics of the "gag rule" were thus on target in observing
that it disempowered poor women but incorrect in assum-
ing that it shut the door to referrals for abortion. Rather,
its therapeutic exception conferred a doorkeeping role on
family planning physicians, analogous to that exercised by
doctors with respect to state anti-abortion laws in the years
before Roe. Under the "gag rule," Title X clinic patients
had no right on their own to information about pregnancy
options. However, clinic physicians had the authority to
explore patients' feelings about pregnancy, offer informa-
tion about options, and make referrals for possible abor-
tion, all under the rubric of medical indication.
Re-medicalizing abortion: temptations
and hazards
Had the "gag rule" lasted, three categories of medical
indication for abortion might have been expected to ex-
pand-the condition of the fetus, the mother's physical
health, and the mother's mental health. All would have
posed the moral difficulties that inhere in determinations of
whether someone's misfortune merits a medical response.
Clinicians confronted by the distress of pregnant patients
not wanting to give birth would have been tempted to
broaden the domain of professionally-accepted medical
indications for abortion. I turn now to a discussion of the
attractions and hazards of so doing. Although my focus is
on medical indication in the abortion counseling context,
the discussion that follows applies to the medicalization of
abortion access more generally.
Medical progress and moral authority
One influence that would have invited a widening of the
scope of medical indication is scientific progress: we know
much more today than we did a generation ago about the
pitfalls of pregnancy for both mother and fetus. Our en-
hanced ability to predict and biologically explain these
pitfalls makes their medicalization seem more plausible.
This effect would probably have been strongest for
fetal indication. Popular and professional acceptance of
fetal defect as a medical justification for abortion was
catalyzed in the 196os by grotesque images of fetal defor-
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mity caused by maternal rubella infection and use of the
tranquilizer Thalidomide.53 In the years since, the teratoge-
nic potential of myriad other drugs and environmental
toxins has been recognized, knowledge of genetic determi-
nants of fetal disease has proliferated, and sophisticated
genetic and intrauterine diagnostic technologies have come
into being. The resulting growth in medicine's ability to
detect fetuses that are defective or at risk invites a corre-
sponding expansion of fetal indications for abortion.
Awareness of the maternal health risks posed by preg-
nancy has also grown, creating a basis for the broadening
of this indication for abortion. Advances in the manage-
ment of high risk pregnancies are a countervailing influ-
ence: if prenatal care can reduce the risk, pregnancy
termination may seem less justifiable. Had the "gag rule"
survived, the principle of informed consent and its premise
of patient autonomy would have weighed in favor of
allowing the patient to choose between these two ap-
proaches to high-risk pregnancy-and in favor of preserv-
ing access to each option by empowering physicians to find
that either was medically indicated. The Supreme Court's
refusal to read Roe to require the federal government to
pay for abortion54 need not have constrained physician
discretion to find that abortion was medically indicated.
Scientific advance could probably have had less influ-
ence on the scope of mental health indications for abor-
tion. During the years immediately preceding Roe, the vast
majority of abortions performed pursuant to the criminal
law's therapeutic exception were done for psychiatric indi-
cations.s5 Sympathetic judges encouraged this use of psy-
chiatry. In Vuitch, the Supreme Court construed the
therapeutic exception at issue to permit abortion on men-
tal health grounds "whether or not the patient had a
previous history of mental defects."56
Psychiatrists who evaluated women who wanted abor-
tions purported to predict whether they would develop
mental illness if forced to carry unwanted pregnancies to
term. But such predictions stood up poorly to scientific
scrutiny.57 Psychiatry lacked the knowledge base needed to
identify predisposing factors in pregnant women.58 Today,
a generation later, psychiatry is no more capable in this
regard, despite remarkable advances in the biological un-
derstanding and treatment of major mental illnesses.
On the other hand, psychiatric judgments about the
necessity of abortion could draw greater credibility today
from organized psychiatry's recently-achieved consensus
in support of a standardized, statistically reliable diagnos-
tic system. By providing common terms for the reporting
of clinical observations and conclusions, this system 9 em-
powers psychiatrists to convey their judgments with a
new descriptive consistency that invites professional and
popular confidence. Psychiatric predictions of the conse-
quences of unwanted pregnancy may be no more accu-
rate today than they were a generation ago, but they can
be stated in more standardized terms, enhancing their
aura of scientific authority.
The Widening Domain of Health
Perceptions of whether a problem is medical are power-
fully influenced by social and cultural developments that
lie beyond the scope of this article." Since World War II,
western society (and its physicians) has evolved an expan-
sive conception of health, encompassing physical, mental,
and social well-being.6' This vision extends far beyond the
physiologic effect of a prescribed drug or procedure. It has
animated physician activism on behalf of such causes as
international human rights61 and the prevention of nuclear
war. 63 The broader the medical profession's view of health,
the larger the domain of medically indicated action (and
the smaller the realm of non-medicalized misfortune).
Physicians who take both a broad view of health and a
dim view of denying women access to abortion may be
inclined to see the adverse consequences of unwanted
childbirth as medical problems and abortion as medically
indicated in many situations. Today, in contrast to a gen-
eration ago, 64 most physicians support the right to abortion
on request. 65 In tandem with an expansive conception of
health, this sea-change in medical opinion could favor
growth of the therapeutic exception beyond its pre-Roe
bounds in the face of highly restrictive abortion regulations.
Moral and clinical dangers
For now, at least, the threat of regulation so restrictive as
to render the therapeutic exception creitical to women's
access to abortion has eased. The election of President
Clinton and Roe's survival, albeit in weakened form, have
tilted the political landscape toward the pro-choice posi-
tion. Yet this landscape remains seismically active. A fu-
ture shift in the opposite direction could confront
American physicians with pressure to make abortion
widely accessible on "medical necessity" grounds.
Should this occur, the moral and clinical dangers of
abortion doorkeeping ought to give physicians pause. A
physician's finding that abortion is medically indicated is
a subjective moral choice presented in scientific guise.
This alone is not of particular note-every medical rec-
ommendation has subjective content, e.g., a tradeoff be-
tween competing risks or between risks and cost.6 6 What
merits concern is that an abortion referral involves a
moral choice that is the subject of bitter social dispute. A
finding of medical necessity could provide a path of es-
cape from a state-decreed moral preference fervently sup-
ported by many people. The moral content of medical
necessity is vividly illustrated in Switzerland: abortion-
seekers from Catholic areas commonly travel to Protes-
tant regions, where the requirement that a woman's
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health be at risk is interpreted more broadly. 7 When
strong evidence indicates that pregnancy imminently
threatens a woman's survival, use of the medical necessity
escape route is likely to be tolerated even by many abor-
tion opponents. But the lower the severity or immediacy
of the threat (and the less convincing the medical evi-
dence), the more vulnerable this escape will be to chal-
lenge.
Where the medical indication for abortion is a con-
firmed or suspected fetal defect, the moral content of
medical judgment will be openly exposed to social and
political attack. The Reagan administration's challenge to
medical discretion to withhold treatment from defective
newborns"8 illustrates the vulnerability of physician discre-
tion to political attack in an analogous context.
Mental health indications for abortion are even more
problematic. The standardized language of current psychi-
atric diagnosis provides poor cover for psychiatrists' in-
ability to predict accurately whether a woman will develop
major psychiatric illness if forced to carry her pregnancy to
term. Without valid grounds for making such predictions,
psychiatrists called upon to make these determinations will
be left to their prejudices, 69 as they were a generation ago. 70
Confronted with a woman's anguish over the prospect of
an unwanted child, a clinician may be tempted to invent
the necessary prediction. 7' The implausibility of these pre-
dictions as a scientific enterprise invites skepticism about
their legitimacy-and about the integrity of psychiatric
evaluation in general.
Moreover, the boundary between psychiatric symp-
toms and non-medicalized misery remains ill-defined. 7 By
broad social consensus, psychosis and some other pro-
foundly disabling mental states today lie within the medical
domain, but other inner experiences and behaviors abide in
disputed territory. American psychiatric diagnosis incorpo-
rates sadness and anxiety, impulsivity and cruelty, disap-
pointment at work and in relationships, and other feelings
and behaviors that many people see as the province of
morality or fate. Abortion referrals based on such symp-
toms could strike many as an illegitimate assertion of
clinical authority outside the social jurisdiction of medicine.
Thus the business of determining the medical necessity
of abortion is sure to be hazardous. It is a moral activity for
which physicians lack clear moral authority. It usurps
authority that both "pro-choice" and "pro-life" adherents
believe should be exercised by others, either pregnant
women themselves or morally interventionist government.
This moral awkwardness poses clinical dangers. Skep-
ticism about the legitimacy of medical judgment in the
abortion context could undermine physicians' credibility
more generally. Credibility is essential in clinical work-it
engenders patient confidence in a physician's diagnostic
conclusions, treatment recommendations, counseling, and
reassurance. It is important for treatment compliance and
for attenuating fear and uncertainty. Erosion of citizen
confidence in medical judgment poses additional dangers at
the public health level. Popular suspicion that public health
admonitions cloak moral aims behind disingenuous science
can lead to disregard of empirically well-supported recom-
mendations that save lives or protect disadvantaged groups
(e.g. HLV-infected persons) from irrational prejudice.
Moreover, for some pregnant women, securing an
abortion referral on medical grounds could be personally
damaging. In some social settings, it may carry stigma,
especially if a psychiatric diagnosis or prediction is in-
volved. Whether or not it carries a social stigma, it invites a
woman to understand her experience as evidence of defec-
tive femininity, not the sexual self-mastery connoted by
abortion obtained as of right. Abortion on medical grounds
also entails an experience of being excused from a pur-
ported social duty. The therapeutic exception presupposes
and reinforces the norm that a woman should carry her
child to term. In obtaining a medical excuse, a person is
encouraged to see illness as an escape from personal and
social responsibilities.73 In addition, the availability of a
medical excuse invites patients to invent or distort symp-
toms in order to qualify. Whether deliberate or uncon-
scious, such deceit is likely to undermine the quality of
clinical care, particularly for psychiatric and other syn-
dromes that present through patients' self-reporting.
For physicians who favor abortion rights, the granting
of medical dispensation for abortion may have an undesir-
able political effect: it could function as a "safety valve"
for social pressure that might otherwise express itself
through pro-choice activism.y4 It also legitimates legal bar-
riers to abortion access by implicating the medical profes-
sion in their enforcement. From the "pro-life" physician's
perspective, the very notion of medically necessary abor-
tion is morally oppressive. It pits private conviction against
professional duty; if abortion is medically indicated in
some circumstances, then abortion counseling and referral
when they arise constitute an ethical obligation.
Justifying the medical gatekeeper: Private
space versus public preferences
Medical indication is thus deeply problematic as a basis for
abortion access. Yet a case can be made for medical dis-
pensation as a means for shielding private decisions about
abortion from the force of anti-abortion politics. A pri-
mary function of law is the mediation of inevitable conflict
between private and political choices.ys Societies devise
myriad legal and social mechanisms for the preservation of
separate and conflicting spheres of personal and political
preference.76 Such mechanisms succeed in large measure by
sheltering private choices from public visibility.77 Defer-
ence to physician authority does this for reproductive
choice to the extent that it obscures the subjectivity of the
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decision to abort. If legal protection for reproductive choice
erodes, ways to reduce the public visibility of the decision
to abort will become more important for the preservation
of private choice.
To be sure, the concept of medical necessity is an
imperfect shield for private choice about abortion. The
enclave of private discretion it preserves is the physician's,
not the patient's: the patient's preferences are protected
only insofar as the physician incorporates them into his or
her gatekeeping decision. Moreover, the medical veil over
the subjective core of this decision is translucent, not
opaque. For reasons discussed earlier, the physician-
gatekeeper's exercise of discretion in this area is likely to
engender skepticism. The profession's moral legitimacy
and scientific credibility may be at risk. Physician control
of abortion access is not what either "pro-life" or "pro-
choice" advocates have in mind.
Conclusion
Under the rubric of medical indication, the "gag
rule" allowed family planning physicians considerable dis-
cretion to discuss pregnancy termination with their pa-
tients and to make referrals that could have resulted in
abortion. Yet neither abortion rights leaders nor medical
organizations acknowledged this prior to the "gag rule's"
demise. Rather, their advocacy efforts on behalf of the
rule's repeal ignored the possibility (or at least the signifi-
cance) of a therapeutic exception. In so doing, they pre-
sented the abortion counseling regulations in a maximally
oppressive visage, thereby strengthening the case for re-
peal. The resistance of abortion opponents to the emer-
gence of loopholes in the regulations contributed ironically
to the persuasiveness of this portrayal.
Had President Bush been reelected, the success of this
portrayal would have come at a cost. The dire message
directed to those with the power to repeal the "gag rule"
also reached the clinics and physicians who were expected
to conform to it. This message governed clinic doctors'
understanding of the regulations, effectively foreclosing
liberal use of the therapeutic exception on behalf of preg-
nant women in distress. To a degree that should provoke
disquiet among physicians, professional leaders who por-
trayed the regulations in these unnecessarily dire terms
risked engaging in self-fulfilling prophecy. The failure of
family planning physicians to employ the therapeutic ex-
ception broadly would have been a product of professional
reluctance, not legal command.
What accounted for this reluctance? The serious moral
and clinical problems posed by medical management of
abortion access were surely important factors. They
weighed in favor of the conclusion that the medical escape
route around barriers to abortion access should be fol-
lowed, if at all, with serious misgivings. Yet these problems
have not prevented physicians in Europe and elsewhere
from employing the therapeutic exception liberally to avert
legal proscriptions against abortion. I conclude by positing
some reasons for the therapeutic exception's failure to
thrive in America in the abortion counseling context. The
key to this failure, I suggest, lies in the resonance between
the moral and clinical infirmities of medical gatekeeping
and the interests of the activists who shaped the profession's
and the public's understanding of the "gag rule."
Most obviously, abortion opponents had no interest
in the emergence of a significant therapeutic exception.
Having fought (unsuccessfully) for its elimination when
the abortion counseling regulations were being written,
they were not likely to defer to its professionally-mediated
expansion. On the contrary, when the Bush administration
pointed publicly to the medical escape path in an effort to
reduce the fury of "gag rule" opponents, some anti-abor-
tion activists alleged that the administration was sidling
away from its pro-life position. 78 From their absolutist
perspective, even this modest gesture toward accommoda-
tion represented a failure of moral commitment, rather
than a pragmatic attempt to placate a powerful opposi-
tion. Any visible effort by the medical profession to expand
the accepted medical indications for abortion would have
probably aroused these activists' bitter opposition.
The therapeutic exception had no more appeal for pro-
choice advocates. The feminist concerns that animate pro-
choice activism in America center on women's autonomy
with respect to intimate matters and women's right to take
part in society as equals.79 The medicalization of abortion
access in the Title X context would have implicated both of
these concerns. Most basically, medical gatekeeping denies
women's claim to sexual autonomy by placing reproduc-
tive choice within the domain of physician authority. Addi-
tionally, because the medical authority it confers governs
women's reproductive decision-making while leaving men
beyond its ambit, making abortion available only on medi-
cal grounds disregards feminist aspirations for equal treat-
ment and respect. For feminists old enough to recall how
women obtained legal authorization to abort in the years
before Roe, the memories of male-dominated medical
boards passing judgment upon traumatized women still
rankle.
From a feminist perspective, equal regard for women
in society is further compromised by the therapeutic
exception's invidious normative implication-that the ideal
woman is a well-functioning reproductive vessel, and that
failure to carry a pregnancy to term bespeaks biological or
psychological inadequacy. This implication-and its con-
sequences for women's self-perceptions and socio-eco-
nomic prospects-ensured that the medicalization of
abortion access in federally-funded family planning clinics
would meet an unwelcome feminist reception. For the pro-
choice activists who publicly defined the case against the
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"gag rule," these concerns eclipsed the therapeutic
exception's potential to make a humane difference in the
lives of some pregnant women.
From the perspective of medical leaders, the prospect
of an open-ended therapeutic exception was anathema
because of its implications for professional credibility. The
dissonance between the thinly-veiled moral content of the
abortion gatekeeping role and the aura of science that
inspires Americans' regard for medicine would have under-
mined the cultural authority of medicine more generally.
American physicians already face a rising tide of skepti-
cism. As health care costs continue to soar, the reasoning
behind medical decisions is increasingly being questioned.
Moreover, the clinical autonomy so cherished by physi-
cians is rapidly eroding as health care payers strive to
contain costs via "managed care' In this context, it is
hardly surprising that the leaders of American medicine
had little stomach for the skepticism that would surely
have resulted from the medicalization of abortion access.
The therapeutic exception did not produce a prag-
matic accommodation in the abortion counseling contro-
versy because it was not responsive to the most
passionately-felt concerns of the controversy's partisans.
Because of this empathic failure, the potential breadth of
the exception went unrecognized and unexplored by the
activists who framed the "gag rule" debate. A broader
lesson to be drawn from this experience is that compro-
mise on the abortion question cannot be dispassionately
engineered and imposed, by regulators (or courts) emo-
tionally disconnected from the parties to the struggle. The
principal infirmity of such disengagement is that it blocks
appreciation of the attitudes that drive the struggle. Com-
promises uninformed by such appreciation risk leaving the
parties with the sense of having been disregarded.
Greater engagement, on the other hand, cannot insure
successful accommodation. Given the bitter feelings that
drive the abortion conflict, it may be more realistic to
expect merely that our political leaders not disconnect
themselves from the passions felt by both sides. Perhaps, if
political leaders committed themselves to such an obliga-
tion, our ongoing differences over this bitter question
would seem less venomous than they do today.
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